By Kavaljit Singh
On October 12, Raghuram
Rajan, the new Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, announced that the
RBI will soon issue new rules allowing a more liberal entry of foreign
banks in India. “That is going to be a big opening because one could
even contemplate taking over Indian banks, small Indian banks and so
on,” he stated in Washington at an event organized by the Institute of
International Finance, a global banking lobby group.
The announcement of a reversal
of long-standing regulatory policy for banking at an event organized by a
lobby group is questionable as the wider developmental and regulatory
concerns related to a liberalized entry of foreign banks are yet to be
discussed in Parliament.
In the Indian context, the key
policy issue is — do the benefits of foreign bank entry greatly outweigh
the potential costs? Foreign banks have been operating in India for the
past many decades and yet we find no evidence of the widely held notion
that foreign banks add to domestic competition, increase access to
financial services and ensure greater financial stability in the host
countries. As witnessed during the global financial crisis of 2008,
foreign banks reduced their domestic lending in India by as much as 20
per cent whereas the state-owned banks played a counter-cyclical role
during the crisis.
Are Foreign Banks Discriminated in India?
It is widely believed that the
entry of foreign banks in the Indian market is highly restricted and the
regulatory framework discriminates against the foreign banks. Let us
examine the ground realities. Currently, there are 41 foreign banks
operating in India with 323 branches and 1414 ATMs. Another 46 foreign
banks operate through their representative offices. It is often
overlooked that even without branch licenses, foreign banks have been
expanding business through off-site ATMs, non-banking finance companies
and off-balance sheet exposures.
As per on-balance sheet
businesses, foreign banks own 8 per cent of the total banking assets in
India. However if one includes off-balance sheet businesses (e.g.,
forward exchange contracts and guarantees), then the ownership patterns
dramatically reverse as foreign banks are the biggest players in the
off-balance sheet businesses with a combined market share of 62 per cent
in 2012. The total share of foreign banks as a percentage of the
banking assets of India (both on- and off-balance-sheet items) was more
than 40 percent in 2012.
As per India’s commitment at the
World Trade Organisation, licenses for new foreign banks may be denied
when the share of foreign banks’ assets in domestic banking system
(including both on- and off-balance-sheet items) exceeds 15 per cent.
Till date, India has not invoked the WTO commitments to deny the entry
of foreign banks in the country. Rather, the number of branches
permitted each year to foreign banks has been higher than the WTO
commitments of 12 branches in a year.
In addition, foreign banks in
India are free to undertake any banking activity (e.g., wholesale,
retail, investment banking, foreign exchange, etc.) which is allowed to
domestic banks. In Singapore, China and the US, strict restrictions have
been imposed on the kind of businesses that could be carried out by
foreign banks within their jurisdictions.
Where is Reciprocity in Market Access?
If India opens up its banking
sector, how much market access Indian banks will get in return? The
recent experience shows that market access to Indian banks is far from
satisfactory. During 2003-07, India allowed US-based banks to open 19
branches (excluding the off-site ATMs). But, in the same period, the US
did not allow a single Indian bank to open a branch or subsidiary or
representative office in its territory despite many requests made by
public and private sector banks.
Under the India-Singapore
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (2005), the RBI allowed
market access to three Singaporean banks as per the agreement but the
Monetary Authority of Singapore refused to fulfill its time-bound
commitment for providing full bank license (Qualifying Full Bank status)
to three Indian banks. The MAS had imposed higher qualifying standards
in the form of Asset Management Ratio on the Indian banks compared to
other international banks operating in Singapore. Whereas the RBI does
not discriminate between foreign and domestic banks on prudential and
regulatory norms.
The Urban-centric Foreign Banks
Till date, most of branches of
foreign banks are located in metropolitan areas and major Indian cities
where bulk of premium banking business is concentrated. As on March
2012, out of total 322 branches of foreign banks, 246 branches (76%)
were located in metros, 61 (19%) in urban areas and the rest 15 (5%) in
semi-urban and rural areas. It is distressing to note that foreign banks
such as Standard Chartered Bank and BNP Paribas have not yet opened a
single branch in the rural areas despite operating in India for more
than 150 years.
Further, foreign banks are reluctant to serve the poor and low-income
people residing in metropolitan and urban areas. There is no regulatory
ban in India on foreign banks to serve the urban poor and low-income
people.
The Niche Banking Model
Typically, foreign (and some big
private banks) are averse to provide banking services to the poor
people because they find such clients less lucrative. The foreign banks
“cherry-pick” the most profitable businesses and affluent customers
residing in the metros and urban areas.
They tend to follow “exclusive banking” by offering services to a
small number of clients. The foreign banks are mainly interested in
serving three niche market segments in India: up-market consumer retail
finance, wealth management services and investment banking.
Several foreign banks and their lobby groups have publicly expressed
their discomfort in fulfilling the mandatory priority sector lending
requirements. Rather they prefer a niche banking model with no riders in
terms of social and developmental banking. Hence, the real issue is not
xenophobic hostility towards foreign banks but their niche business
model in India devoid of social and developmental banking.
Financial Inclusion or Exclusion?
Given their business model
oriented towards niche banking, will foreign banks augment the reach of
the banking system to 500 million Indian citizens who do not have access
to basic banking services? What specialization and international
experience do foreign banks have when it comes to providing basic
banking services to small farmers, landless workers and urban poor
dwellers?
Recent studies have pointed out that 72 per cent of Indian farmers
have no access to the formal banking system. One of the important
factors behind rising farmer suicides in the countryside is lack of
access to cheap credit from banks and institutional sources. Will the
foreign banks open branches in the rural areas and compete with
traditional moneylenders in the rural banking markets?
The contribution of foreign
banks in the opening of “no frills” bank account under the financial
inclusion program has been abysmal, as documented in various RBI
reports. Can foreign banks be forced to meet the targets of financial
inclusion for rural households, as suggested by the Committee on
Financial Inclusion? Where would foreign banks open their branches in
New Delhi? Friends Colony (an upmarket area of South Delhi) or
Jahangirpuri (a low income group area of North Delhi)?
If the entry of foreign banks is allowed through acquisition of
domestic banks, will it not lead to concentration of banking markets and
loss of competition?
These are some of the important policy questions which need to be
addressed before rolling out the red carpet treatment to foreign banks.
Learning from International Experiences
Research studies conducted jointly by SOMO and Madhyam (available at www.madhyam.org.in)
on the impact of banking sector liberalization in South Korea and
Uganda offer several important policy lessons. In South Korea, foreign
bank played an eminent role in building of short-term foreign borrowings
which induced financial fragility and risks in the Korean banking
sector before and after the 2008 financial crisis.
In Uganda, a rapid entry of
foreign banks through acquisitions and takeovers has led to a situation
where rural areas remain under-banked and the bulk of bank credit goes
to trade. With foreign banks controlling 87 percent of Uganda’s banking
assets, the rural households in Uganda are largely dependent on informal
sources of finance to meet their consumption and investment needs.
In many Latin American countries
such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile, there was a considerable decline in
competition in the aftermath of liberal entry of foreign banks.
The global financial crisis has
put a big question mark about the efficiency, “best practices” and
state-of-the-art risk management models of big international banks.
The crisis has shown how many big international banks transmitted financial shocks across countries.
Several banks (including HSBC,
UBS and Credit Suisse) have recently paid billions of dollars in fines
for their alleged role in Libor rate-fixing scandal, money laundering
and other corrupt practices. The JPMorgan Chase has been associated with
several trading scandals in the recent past and has agreed to pay $5.1
billion to settle claims that it sold bad mortgages to two government
agencies of the US (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) ahead of the financial
crisis. According to media reports, JPMorgan may end up paying as much
as $13 billion to settle all the pending claims over its reckless
trading and market manipulative practices. Should India give such banks a
free run?
Finally, we should not forget
that the Indian banking system has remained insulated from global
turmoil thanks to a limited presence of foreign banks, enlarged state
ownership of the banking system, and a relatively strong regulatory
framework.
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